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kezdjen tanulni
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preceding experience and observation; only by thinking about our way of observing events we can conclude that there is sth like causality; we give the meaning to those sequences by presupposing causality
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synthetic a priori knowledge kezdjen tanulni
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"all phenomena have a cause"; "the world as we observe is three dimensional"
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the idea that only empirical data may count as good reasons for defending scientific claims
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kezdjen tanulni
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valid, deductive argument
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deductive-nomological model of science kezdjen tanulni
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we have a law from which we deduce our conclusions
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kezdjen tanulni
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going from particular observations to general claims in inductive reasoning one goes from a set of particular observed phenomena and draws a conclusion about a general law applicable to phenomena which have not been yet observed
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correspondence model of truth kezdjen tanulni
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a claim is true if it corresponds with reality
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kezdjen tanulni
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i.e. we can observe that apple is green
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kezdjen tanulni
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What makes a theoretical concept for grasping non-observable phenomena into a good concept kezdjen tanulni
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Robustness, Fit, Predictability
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kezdjen tanulni
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a concept should be usable in more than one context and it may mean that it will cover a set of phenomena
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kezdjen tanulni
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claims that one makes using these concepts, should fit into a more general theory
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kezdjen tanulni
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using a particular concept, one should be able to make a trustworthy predictions about the occurrence of the phenomenon referred to nay the concept
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kezdjen tanulni
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there will always be many reason-giving considerations that support the truth of a particular claim
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kezdjen tanulni
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knowledge should only be based on experience and observations; the main thesis of logical positivism is verificationism
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kezdjen tanulni
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only claims which can be verified through empirical observations can have any meaning, therefore can be true or false
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kezdjen tanulni
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it is sth that we cannot verify through observations or sensory experience; something above physics that is driving everything; i.e. religion
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kezdjen tanulni
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Rationalism, Empiricism, Idealism
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kezdjen tanulni
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thinking is the basis for all knowledge; thinking is what crates knowledge; no empirical evidence
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kezdjen tanulni
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all knowledge comes from observation; it lacks causality, no theory, we cannot predict; we cannot transfer data into knowledge cuz we lack structure
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kezdjen tanulni
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all knowledge comes from experience; the ability to structure experience is the idea; the problem is the question where these ideas come from
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kezdjen tanulni
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rather than assuming that we have the ability to know before we experience anything we now have sth very powerful called logic to organise our experience
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kezdjen tanulni
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logical nonsense, logical truth/analytical statements, metaphysics, empirical truth/synthetic statement
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kezdjen tanulni
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all statatemsnt that we know ain't true before experiencing them
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logical truth/analytical statements kezdjen tanulni
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we don't need to observe it cuz by definition it is true; "the bachelor is unmarried"
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kezdjen tanulni
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knowledge that we cannot verify through observations
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empirical truth/synthetic statement kezdjen tanulni
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we can verify its truth through observations
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kezdjen tanulni
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truth of statement depends on a matter of fact; through observation; this circle has diameter of 10 meter
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kezdjen tanulni
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truth of statement depends on the logical structure of a statement; logical analysis; this circle is round
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kezdjen tanulni
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for every statement in the system of knowledge for that statement to be true one should be able to use logical and through logic to go back to your individual experience
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the unity of science ideal kezdjen tanulni
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all knowledge should be able to put in a simple system
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Problems in logical positivism kezdjen tanulni
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theoretical concepts, problem of induction
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Theoretical concepts - LP problems kezdjen tanulni
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certain concepts cannot be reduced to observations alone; hence we employ intensional and extensional meanings of concepts
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kezdjen tanulni
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conjuztion of general properties that together define a concept
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the set of all real-life phenomena that together define the concept
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kezdjen tanulni
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mąkę up the properties of a concept; firm performance determine earnings and ROE
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made up of its respective properties; democracy can only be a democracy when there are free elections
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kezdjen tanulni
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allowing both theoretical concepts may happen when they explain something that is not apparent from observation alone and the use of these concepts lead to the development of new knowledge to be tested
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kezdjen tanulni
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drawing general conclusions from a finite number of observations; new information can change the truth value of the conclusion
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kezdjen tanulni
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drawing specific conclusions through referring to general rules; new information has no influence upon the truth value of the conclusion
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